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Introspective Insecurity
Tim Bayne
This paper examines the case for pessimism concerning the trustworthiness of in-
trospection. I begin with a brief examination of two arguments for introspective
optimism, before turning in more detail to Eric Schwitzgebel’s case for the view
that introspective access to one’s own phenomenal states is highly insecure. I ar-
gue that there are a number of ways in which Schwitzgebel’s argument falls short
of its stated aims. The paper concludes with a speculative proposal about why
some types of phenomenal states appear to be more introspectively elusive than
others. 
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1 Introduction
There is a curious ambivalence in current atti-
tudes  towards  our  epistemic  relationship  to
consciousness.  Some theorists hold an optim-
istic view of  the powers of  introspection,  re-
garding judgments about one’s current experi-
ences  as  epistemically  secure—perhaps  some
of the most secure judgments that we make.
Optimists rarely claim that we have exhaust-
ive and infallible access to consciousness, but
they do hold the epistemic credentials of  in-
trospection in high regard, at least when in-
trospection  is  directed  towards  the  phenom-
enal character of consciousness. Those inclined
to optimism don’t doubt that it is possible to
mis-remember or mis-report one’s experiences,
but  they tend to assume that  one has some
kind of  epistemic access to one’s experiences
simply by having them.1
Running alongside this vein of optimism is a
rather more pessimistic strand of thought, accord-
ing to which the epistemic credentials of intro-
spection are chronically insecure. Far from regard-
ing introspection as a light that illuminates every
corner  of  consciousness,  pessimists  suspect  that
significant swathes of experience are accessible to
introspection only with great difficulty if at all.2
1 Theorists  inclined  towards  optimism  include  Chalmers (2003),
Gertler (2012),  Goldman (2004),  Horgan et al. (2006),  Horgan &
Kriegel (2007), Siewert (2007), and Smithies (2012).
2 The contrast between “optimists” and “pessimists” is far from sharp,
for optimists often grant that epistemic access to consciousness can
be (very) challenging, and pessimists often allow that there are ex-
periential  domains  with  respect  to  which  introspection  is  trust-
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According to Dan Haybron,  “[…]even the gross
qualitative character of our conscious experience
can elude our introspective capacities” (Haybron
2007,  p.  415).  Sounding  a  similar  note,  Maja
Spener has argued that “philosophers and psycho-
logists routinely overestimate the epistemic cre-
dentials  of  introspection  in  their  theorizing”
(Spener unpublished;  see  also  Spener 2011a,
2011b, and  2013). But perhaps the most thor-
oughgoing pessimist is Eric Schwitzgebel:
Most  people  are  poor  introspectors  of
their  own ongoing conscious  experience.
We fail not just in assessing the causes of
our mental states or the processes under-
writing them; and not just in our judg-
ments  about  nonphenomenal  mental
states like traits, motives and skills, and
not only when we are distracted, or pas-
sionate or inattentive or self-deceived, or
pathologically deluded or when we’re re-
worthy. Nonetheless, these terms are useful insofar as they capture
the overarching  attitude that  the two groups  of  theorists  express
with regard to introspection. 
flecting  about  minor  matters,  or  about
the past, or only for a moment, or when
fine  discrimination  is  required.  We  are
both ignorant and prone to error. There
are major lacunae in our self-knowledge
that are not easily filled in, and we make
gross, enduring mistakes about even the
most basic features of our currently on-
going  conscious  experience  (or  “phe-
nomenology”), even in favourable circum-
stances  of  careful  reflection,  with  dis-
tressing regularity. (2008, p. 247) 
Although Schwitzgebel’s pessimism is tempered
by moments of optimism, the dominant theme
in his work is that introspection cannot be trus-
ted  to  reveal  anything  other  than  the  most
mundane  features  of  consciousness.  Descartes,
Schwitzgebel argues,  “had  it  quite  backwards
when  he  said  the  mind—including  especially
current conscious experience—was better known
than the outside world” (2008, p. 267). 
I feel the pull of both optimism and pess-
imism. In my optimistic moments I find it hard
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Glossary
Introspection An unmediated judgment that has as its intentional object a current psychological
or phenomenal state of one’s own.
Discrimination The capacity to attentively single the state out from amongst the other experi-
ences that one has at the time in question.
Categorize To categorize a phenomenal state is to locate it within a taxonomy of some kind.
Directly and indirectly introspect-
ive judgments
A direct introspective judgment concerns the phenomenal character/content of 
one’s current phenomenal state(s) and is grounded in a single act of introspective 
attention, whereas an indirect introspective judgment concerns the general nature 
of one’s conscious experience and is not grounded in a single act of introspective 
attention.
Scaffolded judgments An introspective judgment is scaffolded if and only if it is accompanied by a dis-
position to make a first-order judgment (e.g., a perceptual judgment) whose con-
tent broadly corresponds to the judgment of the introspective judgment. For ex-
ample, the judgment that one has a visual experience as of a red tomato in front 
of one is scaffolded insofar as it is accompanied by a disposition to make the per-
ceptual judgment that there is a red tomato in front of one.
Freestanding judgments An introspective judgment is freestanding if and only if it is not accompanied 
by a disposition to make a first-order judgment (e.g., a perceptual judgment) 
whose contents broadly corresponds to the judgment of the introspective judg-
ment.
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to take seriously the suggestion that I might be
guilty of “gross and enduring mistakes” about
the basic features of my current phenomenology.
But the arguments for pessimism are powerful
and  not  easily  dismissed,  and  I  worry  that
Schwitzgebel is right when he suggests that the
allure  of  optimism  might  be  due  to  nothing
more than the fact that “no-one ever scolds us
for getting it wrong” (2008, p. 260). 
A central aim of this paper is to provide
an  overview  of  Schwitzgebel’s  case  for  intro-
spective pessimism, and to chart a number of
ways in which the optimist might respond to it.
But although this paper can be read as a de-
fence of a kind of optimism, my central concern
is not so much to take sides in this debate as to
advance it by noting various complexities that
have perhaps been overlooked. But before turn-
ing to the debate itself let me make a few com-
ments about its importance. An account of the
trustworthiness of introspection is likely to have
a bearing on two important issues. Most obvi-
ously, it has implications for the use of intro-
spection as a source of evidence regarding philo-
sophical and scientific debates about conscious-
ness. Whether or not introspection is our sole
form  of  access  to  consciousness,  there  is  no
doubt that it is currently treated as a  central
form of such access, and thus doubts about the
reliability  of  introspection  engender  doubts
about the viability of  the study of  conscious-
ness. A second issue on which the trustworthi-
ness of introspection has an important bearing
concerns debates about the nature of introspec-
tion, and in particular the relationship between
introspection and consciousness. Some accounts
of introspection take a person to be necessarily
acquainted  with  his  or  her  conscious  states,
where acquaintance is an epistemic relationship
of  a  particularly  intimate  kind (Gertler 2012;
Horgan et al. 2006; Smithies 2012). It is fair to
say  that  such  approaches  are  optimistic  by
nature,  and  although  advocates  of  such  ac-
counts  have  attempted  to  accommodate  the
possibility of introspective ignorance and error
(see e.g.,  Horgan 2012), the success of such at-
tempts is  very much an open question. Other
accounts of “introspection”—such as those that
deny that there are any distinctively first-per-
sonal  modes  of  access  to  consciousness—can
easily accommodate introspective ignorance and
error, but they struggle to account for the epi-
stemic security that often seems to characterize
introspection. In short, an account of introspec-
tion’s epistemic profile would function as a use-
ful constraint on accounts of its nature. 
2 Motivating optimism 
By “introspection” I mean an unmediated judg-
ment that has as its intentional object a current
psychological state of one’s own. Introspection
can take as its object a wide variety of psycho-
logical  states,  but  here  I  am  concerned  only
with the introspection of  phenomenal  states—
states that there is “something it is like” for the
subject in question to be in. In principle  one
could  have  any  number  of  reasons  for  self-
ascribing a phenomenal state—for example, it is
possible  to  self-ascribe  pain  on  the  basis  of
neural or behavioural evidence—but introspec-
tion involves the self-ascription of phenomenal
states on the basis of seemingly “direct” contact
with them.3 
There are many aspects  of  consciousness
with respect to which we clearly have little to
no introspective access. For example, introspec-
tion is clearly not a source of information about
the  neural  basis  of  consciousness  or  its  func-
tional role. But surely, one might think, intro-
spection  can  provide  trustworthy  answers  to
such questions  as,  “Am I  now in a conscious
state with such-and-such a phenomenal charac-
ter?” Roughly speaking, to regard introspection
as able to reveal the phenomenal character of
one’s conscious states is to have an optimistic
attitude towards it. But there is more than one
sense in which introspection might be said to
reveal the character of consciousness, and thus
more than one way to be an introspective op-
timist.
One way in which introspection can reveal
a phenomenal state is by allowing one to  dis-
criminate it from its phenomenal neighbours. I
take discrimination to be bound up with the ca-
3 Introspection may involve direct access to consciousness at a per-
sonal level and yet also be inferential and indirect at sub-personal
levels of description. 
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pacity to single the state out from amongst the
other  experiences—e.g.,  thoughts,  perceptual
experiences,  and  bodily  sensations—that  hap-
pen  to  populate  one’s  field  of  consciousness.
Discriminative  access  to  an  experience  allows
one to direct one’s attention towards it and to
thus make it the potential target of demonstrat-
ive thought—“I wish that this experience would
stop”. A second mode of introspective access to
consciousness  involves  the  deployment  of  cat-
egories. To categorize a phenomenal state is to
locate it within a taxonomy of some kind. Cat-
egorical access to the experience of an itch, for
example, involves recognizing it  as a phenom-
enal state of a certain type—a state, perhaps,
that has a certain intensity, bodily location, and
relations  to  other  experiences.  Categorical  ac-
cess is a more sophisticated form of access than
discriminative access.  Just as  it  is  possible  to
discriminate  a  bird  from  its  surroundings
without being able to recognize it as a bird—
perhaps  all  one  can do is  bring  it  under  the
demonstrative, “that thing there in the sky”—
so too it may be possible to discriminate a phe-
nomenal state without being able to recognize it
as the kind of phenomenal state it is. Mature
human beings enjoy some degree of categorical
and discriminative access to their  phenomenal
states,  but many conscious creatures—non-lin-
guistic animals and young children, for example
—may enjoy only discriminative access to con-
sciousness.4 
With this in mind, we can distinguish two
forms of  introspective optimism. Moderate in-
trospective optimism holds that being in a phe-
nomenal state typically brings with it the capa-
city to discriminate that state from its phenom-
enal neighbours,  while a more radical form of
introspective  optimism  holds  that  being  in  a
phenomenal  state  typically  brings  with  it  the
capacity  to  both  discriminate  and  accurately
categorize it. By the same token, introspective
4 This claim would need to be tempered if as seems plausible discrim-
inative access requires a minimal form of categorical access. Consider
again the case of discriminating a bird but failing to recognize it as a
bird. This counts as a failure of categorical access insofar as one fails
to bring it under the concept <bird> (or related concepts such as
<robin>), but it is arguable that in order to discriminate it from its
perceptual background one (or one’s visual system) must bind the
various visual features together as the features of  a single object,
which may require a minimal form of categorical access to the object.
pessimism can be more or less radical depend-
ing on whether its scope is restricted to categor-
ical access (moderate) or includes both categor-
ical and discriminative access (radical). In what
follows,  I  use  the  terms  “introspective  optim-
ism” and “introspective pessimism” to refer to
the  moderate  versions  of  these  views  unless
noted otherwise. 
2.1 The phenomenological argument 
Although  introspective  optimism  is  often  as-
sumed rather than explicitly argued for, I think
it is possible to discern two lines of argument
for it in the literature. Neither argument is con-
clusive,  but taken together they go some way
towards justifying the widespread endorsement
of introspective optimism. 
The  first  argument  is  phenomenological:
introspection seems to reveal itself as providing
a trustworthy source of information about con-
sciousness. In other words, the epistemic secur-
ity of introspection seems to be something that
is manifest in its very phenomenology. Consider
Brie Gertler’s description of what it is like to
attend to the experience that is  generated by
pinching oneself: 
When I try this, I find it nearly impossible
to doubt that my experience has a certain
phenomenal  quality—the  phenomenal
quality  it  epistemically  seems  to  me  to
have, when I focus my attention on the ex-
perience. Since this is so difficult to doubt,
my  grasp  of  the  phenomenal  property
seems not to derive from background as-
sumptions that I could suspend: e.g., that
the  experience  is  caused  by  an  act  of
pinching. It seems to derive entirely from
the experience itself. If that is correct, my
judgment registering the relevant aspect of
how things epistemically seem to me (this
phenomenal  property  is  instantiated)  is
directly  tied  to  the  phenomenal  reality
that is its truthmaker. (2012, p. 111) 
I suspect that Gertler’s comments will strike a
chord with many readers—they certainly reson-
ate with me. Introspection seems not merely to
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provide one with information about one’s exper-
iences, it seems also to “say” something about
the quality of that information. This point can
be illuminated by contrasting introspection with
other forms of access to consciousness. Suppose
that you believe that you have the phenomeno-
logy associated with anger because a friend has
pointed out that you are behaving angrily.  In
cases like this,  testimony provides one with a
form of access to one’s phenomenal states, but
this  access  surely  lacks  the epistemic  security
that introspective access typically possesses—or
at least seems to possess. It would be very odd
to  put  more  faith  in  “third-person”  evidence
concerning  one’s  own  conscious  states  than
“first-person” evidence. 
Now, one might think that even if the phe-
nomenological  consideration  just  surveyed can
explain why optimism seems so compelling, it
surely can’t provide any justification for it. Ap-
pealing to introspection itself in order to estab-
lish its epistemic credentials would be as futile
as attempting to pull oneself up by one’s own
shoelaces.  If  it’s  introspection itself  that is  in
the dock, how could its own testimony exoner-
ate it? 
In considering this  objection we need to
distinguish  two  questions.  One  question  is
whether  introspection  makes  claims  about  its
own  veracity.  A  second  question  is  what  to
make of such claims should they exist—that is,
whether to regard them as providing additional
reasons for thinking that introspection is trust-
worthy.  Beginning  with  the  first  question,  it
seems to me not implausible to suppose that in-
trospection  could bear witness to its own epi-
stemic credentials. After all, perceptual experi-
ence  often  contains  clues  about  its  epistemic
status. Vision doesn’t just provide information
about the objects and properties present in our
immediate environment, it also contains inform-
ation about the robustness of that information.
Sometimes vision presents its take on the world
as having only low-grade quality, as when ob-
jects are seen as blurry and indistinct or as sur-
rounded by haze and fog. At other times visual
experience  represents  itself  as  a  highly  trust-
worthy source of information about the world,
such as when one takes oneself to have a clear
and  unobstructed  view  of  the  objects  before
one. In short, it seems not implausible to sup-
pose  that  vision—and  perceptual  experience
more generally—often contains clues about its
own evidential value. As far as I can see there is
no reason to dismiss the possibility that what
holds of visual experience might also hold true
of  introspection:  acts  of  introspection  might
contain  within  themselves  information  about
the degree to which their content ought to be
trusted.
The  foregoing  addresses  the  first  of  the
two  questions  identified  above  but  not  the
second, for nothing in what I have said provides
any reason to think that introspection is a reli-
able witness to its own veracity. It is one thing
for introspection to represent its deliverances as
trustworthy but it is another for those deliver-
ances to be trustworthy. But this being noted, it
seems to me not unreasonable to think that the
claims  introspection  makes  on  its  own  behalf
should be afforded  some degree of warrant. In
general, we regard perceptual testimony as in-
nocent unless proven guilty, and even if intro-
spection  is  not  itself  a  form of  perception  it
seems reasonable to apply that same rule here.
(After all, it is not clear why we would have ac-
quired  a  cognitive  capacity  if  its  deployment
routinely led us astray.) The phenomenological
argument certainly doesn’t provide any kind of
proof for introspective optimism, but it seems
to me to do more than merely explain why op-
timism is so attractive: it also provides it with
some degree of justification. 
2.2 The conceptual argument 
A rather different argument for optimism takes
as its point of origin the very notion of a phe-
nomenal  state.  By  definition,  a  phenomenal
state is a state that there is “something that it’s
like” for the subject in question to be in. Con-
scious  creatures  enjoy  mental  states  of  many
kinds,  but  it  is  only  phenomenal  states  that
bring with them a subjective perspective. But—
so the argument runs—if a phenomenal state is
a state that there is something it is like to be
in, then the subject of that state must have epi-
stemic  access  to  its  phenomenal  character.  A
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state to which the subject had no epistemic ac-
cess could not make a constitutive contribution
to what it was like for that subject to be the
subject that it was, and thus it could not qual-
ify as a phenomenal state. Call this the concep-
tual argument.5 
How compelling is this argument? It seems
to me that a lot depends on what is implied by
the notion of “epistemic access”. There is little
to recommend the conceptual argument if “epi-
stemic  access”  is  understood in  terms of  cat-
egorization, for it seems fairly clear that a sub-
ject need not possess the capacity to accurately
categorize  its  phenomenal  states  in  order  for
them to contribute to its phenomenal perspect-
ive. Of necessity any phenomenal state will fall
under  categories  of  various  kinds,  but  the
nature of these categories need not be transpar-
ent to the creature experiencing it. 
But  suppose  that  we  construe  epistemic
access  in  terms of  categorization,  rather  than
identification.  Might  the  conceptual  argument
justify a moderate form of optimism, according
to which subjects must have discriminative ac-
cess to their phenomenal states? To make this
clearer, suppose that it is possible for phenom-
enal states to occur within the modules of early
vision of the kind that are concerned with de-
termining  (say)  texture  or  colour  constancy.
Such  phenomenal  states—assuming  that  they
are possible—would be completely inaccessible
to the subject in question. The creature in ques-
tion would be unable to contrast the phenom-
enal character of these states with the phenom-
enal character of any of its other experiences; it
would be unable to single such states out for at-
tention, and it would be unable to make them
the objects of demonstrative thought. As such,
it seems to me that it is very plausible to hold
that they couldn’t be genuinely ascribed to the
subject  in  question,  but  could  at  best  be
ascribed only to one of the subject’s perceptual
modules. The root of this intuition, I suspect,
lies with the thought that a phenomenal state
to which the subject has no discriminative ac-
cess  couldn’t  be  anything  “to”  the  subject—
5 There are echoes here of the claim that phenomenal consciousness
entails  a certain kind of “access consciousness”. For some relevant
discussion see Church (1997) and Clark (2000). 
that in the relevant sense of the phrase there
couldn’t be anything “that it’s like” for the sub-
ject to have the relevant experiences.
Although attractive, this argument is not
without its  problems.  One challenge comes in
the form of creatures that lack introspective ca-
pacities. A creature without introspective capa-
cities might be able to use its conscious states
to discriminate some features of the world from
others,  but it  would not be able  to make its
conscious states themselves objects of  its own
discriminative activities. And yet—the objection
runs—it  would  be  implausible  to  hold  that
creatures that lack the capacity for introspect-
ive  discrimination  cannot  have  phenomenal
states. Intuitively, having phenomenal states is
one thing and being able to discriminate one’s
phenomenal states for each other is another—
and more sophisticated—thing. Thus—the argu-
ment runs—discriminative access to a phenom-
enal state cannot be a necessary condition for
being in that state. 
I certainly agree that it would be implaus-
ible to restrict phenomenal states to creatures
that  possess  introspective  capacities,  but  per-
haps the objection can be met without making
such  a  restriction.  What  we  can  say  is  that
when a creature does acquire introspective ca-
pacities  those  capacities  bring  with  them the
ability  to  discriminate  its  phenomenal  states
from one another (at least under epistemically
benign conditions). So, we can grant that being
in a phenomenal state doesn’t require discrimin-
ative access  to that state,  but also  hold that
creatures  with  introspective  capacities  will  be
able  to  discriminate  their  phenomenal  states
from one another (again, at least when condi-
tions are epistemically benign). 
A second objection to the conceptual argu-
ment concerns states that occupy the “margins”
of consciousness—such as the unnoticed hum of
the refrigerator or the background phenomeno-
logy of mood experiences. It is arguable that in
some cases experiences like this not only fail to
fall within the scope of introspection but in fact
cannot be brought within its scope, for to at-
tend to them would be to bring them into the
“centre” of consciousness and thus change their
phenomenal character. Such states serve as po-
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tential  counter-examples  to  the  claim  that
creatures with introspective capacities must be
able  to  discriminate  their  phenomenal  states
from one another. 
In response, one might grant that even if
the phenomenal states that occur in the mar-
gins of consciousness cannot be singled out for
introspective attention, there is still a sense in
which they can be the objects of discrimination.
Not only can they be discriminated from one
another,  they  can  also  be  discriminated  from
those phenomenal states that do fall within the
scope of attention. Indeed, if such states cannot
be discriminated from their phenomenal neigh-
bours in any way then it is unclear what reason
we could have for thinking of them as falling
within  the  margins  of  consciousness at  all,
rather than being completely unconscious. 
Where do these considerations leave us? I
have suggested that the phenomenological argu-
ment provides some reason to take at least a
moderate form of optimism seriously. It doesn’t,
of course, establish that our access to all kinds
of  phenomenal  states  is  robust—indeed,  one
might even appeal to phenomenological consid-
erations to motivate the idea that our epistemic
access  to  significant  regions  of  phenomenal
space  is  very  poor.  (I  return  to  this  topic
shortly.)  The  conceptual  argument  provides
little reason to think that we will always be able
to categorize our phenomenal states, but it does
provide some motivation for the idea that being
in a phenomenal state brings with it the ability
to discriminate that phenomenal state, at least
when it  comes to creatures  with introspective
capacities. In short, optimism of at least a mod-
erate  form  is  not  merely  a  holdover  from
Cartesianism but  can  be  provided  with  some
degree of support. With these considerations in
mind let us turn now to the case for pessimism. 
3 Motivating pessimism
Two distinctions will prove helpful in what fol-
lows. One distinction is between forms of pessim-
ism that concern only our capacity to identify our
phenomenal states and forms of pessimism that
call into question our capacity to both discrimin-
ate  and  categorize  our  phenomenal  states.  A
second distinction concerns the  scope of pessim-
ism. At one end of the spectrum are local forms
of pessimism that concern only a relatively cir-
cumscribed range of phenomenal states (say, im-
agery experiences), while at the other end of the
spectrum are forms of pessimism that are unres-
tricted in scope. Perhaps no theorist has ever em-
braced a truly  global  form of  pessimism—even
Schwitzgebel  grants  that  introspection  is  trust-
worthy with respect  to certain  aspects  of  con-
sciousness—but  some  forms  of  pessimism  are
clearly wider in scope than others. These two dis-
tinctions are, of course, orthogonal to each other.
One could be a moderate but global pessimist; al-
ternatively, one could endorse a radical but highly
local form of pessimism. 
So much for the varieties of pessimism—
how might one argue for the view? One influen-
tial line of argument for pessimism—or at least
something very much like it—appeals to the al-
leged privacy of introspection. Because an indi-
vidual’s  introspective  judgments  cannot  be
checked by anyone else, it follows—so the argu-
ment runs—that it would be inappropriate to
trust them. This argument is often used to mo-
tivate the view that introspection is scientific-
ally illegitimate,  but it  could also  be used to
motivate the view that one should adopt a scep-
tical  attitude  towards  one’s  own introspective
capacities.6 Although it has been influential, I
will leave this argument to one side in order to
focus on a trio of arguments that aim to estab-
lish not merely that there is no positive reason
to trust introspection (as the argument just out-
lined attempts to do), but that there is positive
reason not to trust it. My presentation of these
arguments will draw heavily on Schwitzgebel’s
work, for he has done more than any other au-
thor to develop and defend them.7 
But before I examine those arguments, I
want  to  consider  the  overall  structure  of
6 For critical discussion of this argument see Goldman (1997,  2004) and
Piccinini (2003, 2011). In my view the most plausible response to it in-
volves denying that introspection is private in the sense required for the
argument to go through. I touch briefly on this idea in section 4. 
7 Schwitzgebel is clearly attracted to a fairly global form of introspect-
ive pessimism, but (to the best of my knowledge) he doesn’t distin-
guish between discriminative and categorical access, and thus it is
unclear whether his version of pessimism is radical or merely moder-
ate. Generally, however, he seems to have something akin to radical
scepticism in mind. 
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Schwitzgebel’s case for global scepticism. As I
read  him,  Schwitzgebel employs  a  two-step
strategy (2008, p. 259). The first step involves
attempting to establish a form of local pessim-
ism via one (or more) of the three argumentat-
ive strategies to be explored below. The second
step involves generalizing from the kinds of phe-
nomenal  states  that  are  the  targets  of  local
pessimism to phenomenal states in general. The
second step is clearly required, for without it we
would have no reason to regard introspection in
general as “faulty, untrustworthy, and mislead-
ing”—“not  just  possibly  mistaken,  but
massively and pervasively” (Schwitzgebel 2008,
p. 259).8 
I  will  consider both steps in due course,
but the crucial point to note for now is that,
considered in the abstract, the second step of
the argument looks somewhat suspect (Bayne &
Spener 2010). Even if there are hard cases for
introspection—that  is,  cases  in  which  intro-
spective access to phenomenology is insecure—
there also easy cases—that is, cases in which in-
trospective access to phenomenology is clearly
secure. Indeed, Schwitzgebel himself grants that
introspection  “may  admit  obvious  cases”  and
that some aspects of visual experience “are so
obvious it would be difficult to go wrong about
them” (Schwitzgebel 2008, p. 253). But if that’s
the  case,  then  one  might  well  ask  why  we
shouldn’t  generalize  from  those  cases  rather
than from the hard cases on which he focuses.
Schwitzgebel complains that to generalize about
introspection only on the basis of the easy cases
“rigs  the game”.  That’s  true.  But it’s  equally
true that to generalize only on the basis of the
hard  cases—as  Schwitzgebel  seems  to  do—
would also rig the game. In fact, it would seem
pretty clear that any comprehensive account of
the  epistemic  landscape  of  introspection  must
8 Another reconstruction of Schwitzgebel’s overarching argumentative
strategy proceeds as follows. Although the arguments from dumb-
founding, dissociation, and variation establish only local forms of in-
trospective pessimism when considered on their own, when taken col-
lectively they provide a good case for a relatively global form of pess-
imism given that each of the three arguments concerns distinct (al-
beit, perhaps, overlapping) domains of phenomenology. Thus under-
stood, Schwitzgebel does not need to appeal to a generalization from
the “hard cases” to introspection in general. Although this construal
provides an alternative route to pessimism, I regard it as less prom-
ising  than  the  one  outlined  in  the  text—both  as  a  reading  of
Schwitzgebel’s work and as an argument in its own right.
take both the hard and easy cases into consider-
ation. Arguably, generalizing beyond the obvi-
ously easy and hard cases requires an account of
what makes the hard cases hard and the easy
cases easy. Only once we’ve made some progress
with that question will we be in a position to
make warranted claims about introspective ac-
cess to consciousness in general. What this sug-
gests is that although there is a formal distinc-
tion between the two steps of Schwitzgebel’s ar-
gument, the steps are not entirely independent
of  each  other,  for  the  fortunes  of  the  second
step rest in part on the case that can be made
for the first step. With that thought in mind,
let us now turn to the arguments for pessimism.
3.1 The argument from dumbfounding 
One line of argument that features prominently
in Schwitzgebel’s work is what I call the argu-
ment  from dumbfounding.9 Arguments  of  this
form involve posing introspective questions that
allegedly  stump  us—questions  that  we  find
ourselves unable to answer with any significant
degree of confidence. Here’s an example of such
an argument:
Reflect  on,  introspect,  your own ongoing
emotional  experience  at  this  instant.  Do
you  even  have  any?  If  you’re  in  doubt,
vividly  recall  some  event  that  still  riles
you until you’re sure enough that you’re
suffering from renewed emotion. Or maybe
your  boredom,  anxiety,  irritation,  or
whatever in reading this essay is enough.
Now let me ask: Is it completely obvious
to you what the character of that experi-
ence is? Does introspection reveal it to you
as clearly as visual observation reveals the
presence of the text before your eyes? Can
you  discern  its  gross  and  fine  features
through introspection as easily and as con-
fidently as you can, through vision, discern
the gross and fine features of nearby ex-
ternal objects? Can you trace its spatiality
(or non-spatiality),  its  viscerality or cog-
nitiveness, its involvement with conscious
9 Following  Hohwy (2011),  Schwitzgebel (2011) calls  this “the argu-
ment from uncertainty”.
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imagery,  thought,  proprioception,  or
whatever, as sharply and infallibly as you
can discern the shape, texture and color of
your desk? (Or the difference  between 3
and 27?) I cannot, of course, force a par-
ticular  answer  to  these  questions.  I  can
only invite you to share my intuitive sense
of uncertainty. (Schwitzgebel 2008, p. 251)
This argument does not appeal to independent
evidence  in  order  to  motivate  pessimism.
Rather, it appeals to first-person considerations:
introspection  itself seems to suggest that there
are  aspects  of  our  own  conscious  experience
that elude our grasp. As Schwitzgebel puts it,
“it’s  not  just  language that  fails  us—most  of
us?—when we confront such questions […] but
introspection itself. […] in the case of emotion,
the very phenomenology itself—the qualitative
character of  our consciousness—is not entirely
evident” (Schwitzgebel 2008, pp. 249–250).
Before  examining the  force  of  this  argu-
ment, let us first consider what kind of pessim-
ism it aims to establish. Does the above passage
call  into  question  our  capacity  to  accurately
categorize our emotional  phenomenology,  or  is
the claim rather that we lack even the capacity
to discriminate our emotional experiences from
one another and from the rest of our phenom-
enal  states?  Although  Schwitzgebel’s  concern
seems to include questions of discriminative ac-
cess—after all, the passage begins by asking if
we can even tell whether or not we have any
emotional phenomenology—I take his worries to
centre on our capacity to accurately categorize
our emotional phenomenology. As I read him,
Schwitzgebel’s questions focus on our ability to
determine  how  our  emotional  experience  is
structured, both internally and in terms of its
relations to phenomenal states of other kinds. 
I  think  that  the  questions  Schwitzgebel
raises are difficult to answer. However, it is not
clear  to  me  that  this  fact  provides  quite  as
much  support  for  introspective  pessimism  as
Schwitzgebel thinks it  does.  Lying behind the
dumbfounding strategy is the assumption that
the questions being posed have determinate an-
swers—that  they are  appropriate  questions  to
ask.  However,  I  suspect that in  an important
range of cases this assumption may be unjusti-
fied.  With  respect  to  the  phenomenology  of
emotion it is natural to assume that the bound-
aries between the phenomenal states associated
with  emotion  are  as  clean  and  sharp  as  the
boundaries between our standard ways of cat-
egorizing emotional states. We regard boredom,
anxiety,  and  irritation  as  distinct  emotional
states, and we also regard each of these states
as  associated  with  distinctive  forms  of  phe-
nomenology. On the basis of these two thoughts
we assume that the phenomenal states associ-
ated  with  these  categories  can  themselves  be
cleanly  distinguished from one another.  Thus,
when  one  finds  oneself  at  a  loss  to  know
whether one is in  the phenomenal state associ-
ated  with  boredom,  anxiety,  or  irritation  one
naturally assumes that the fault lies with one’s
introspective  capacities.  But  perhaps  the mis-
take was to assume that the phenomenology of
emotion can be cleanly demarcated into states
that are uniquely associated with either bore-
dom,  anxiety,  or  irritation.  Perhaps  the  phe-
nomenal states associated with these emotional
states overlap and interpenetrate each other. If
this were the case, then although there might
be  certain  contexts  in  which  one’s  emotional
phenomenology is purely that of (say) boredom,
there may also be other contexts in which one’s
emotional  phenomenology  involves  a  complex
mix of  the phenomenal states  associated with
boredom,  anxiety  and  irritation.  And  if  one
were  in  a  context  like  this,  one  might  be  at
something of a loss to know just how to cat-
egorize one’s emotional state. The only categor-
ies that might come to mind would be those as-
sociated with the folk psychology of emotion—
<boredom>,  <anger>  and  <irritation>—but
these categories might fail to cut the phenomen-
ology of emotion at its joints. In other words,
emotional phenomenology may pose a particular
introspective  challenge  not  because  introspec-
tion  does  a  poor  job  of  acquainting  us  with
emotional  phenomenology,  but  because  the
structure of the phenomenology of emotion fails
to map onto the structure of our folk categories
of emotions in a straightforward manner. 
Other  versions  of  the  argument  from
dumbfounding raise a different set of challenges
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for introspective optimism. Consider the ques-
tion  of  introspective  access  to  visual  imagery.
Schwitzgebel asks his readers to form a visual
image of the front of his or her house, and to
then consider the following questions: 
How  much  of  the  scene  are  you  able
vividly to visualize at once? Can you keep
the image of your chimney vividly in mind
at the same time you vividly imagine (or
“image”) your front door? Or does the im-
age of your chimney fade as your attention
shifts to the door? If there is a focal part
of  your  image,  how much  detail  does  it
have? How stable is it? Suppose that you
are not able to image the entire front of
your house with equal clarity at once, does
your  image  gradually  fade  away towards
the periphery, or does it do so abruptly? Is
there any imagery at all outside the imme-
diate region of focus? If the image fades
gradually away toward the periphery, does
one  lose  colours  before  shapes?  Do  the
peripheral  elements  of  the  image  have
color at all before you think to assign color
to them? Do any parts of  the image? If
some parts of the image have indetermin-
ate colour before a colour is assigned, how
is  that  indeterminacy  experienced—as
grey?—or is it not experienced at all? If
images fade from the centre and it is not a
matter  of  the color  fading,  what exactly
are  the  half-faded  images  like?
(Schwitzgebel 2002, pp. 38–39) 
I think that this line of questioning poses one of
the  most  significant  challenges  to  optimism.
Further,  it  is  doubtful  whether  this  challenge
can be  resisted  in  the  way that  the previous
version of the dumbfounding challenge can, for
these questions don’t seem to rest on any prob-
lematic assumptions. Schwitzgebel isn’t assum-
ing  that  visual  imagery  must  be  pictorial  in
nature, or that it will always be fully detailed
and determinate. Rather, one issue that he ex-
plicitly puts on the table is whether the phe-
nomenology  of  visual  imagery  can  be  purely
“generic” or “gisty”, or whether it must instead
always be specific in some way or another.
But perhaps the dumbfounding challenge
can be met in another way. As  Jakob Hohwy
(2011) has noted, one striking feature of visual
imagery is its instability: 
In the absence of specific goal parameters
for  simulations  there  will  be  much  phe-
nomenal variability because in such condi-
tions  subjects  must  themselves  make  up
the  purposes  for  which  they  imagine
things, or engage in ‘simple’ free-wheeling
imagery. For example, there is an indefin-
ite number of purposes for which you can
imagine the front of your house (walking
up to it,  standing close by,  assessing its
shape, its prettiness, flying around it, how
the postman sees is, smelling it, repairing
it, buying it, selling it etc), each of these
purposes  will  constrain the imagery,  and
thus  the  introspected  phenomenology,  in
different  ways.  This  means  that  subjects
probably do have variable phenomenology,
and  introspectively  report  so  reliably.
(2011, p. 279)
Hohwy’s comments are intended to explain the
variability in the introspective reports that indi-
viduals give, but they also bear on the dumb-
founding  argument.  Perhaps  we  are  not  sure
how best to describe the phenomenology of im-
agery because it is so variable. Imagery experi-
ences  cannot  be  pinned  down,  but  are  con-
stantly shifting in response to our own imagistic
activity.  Precisely  how much  of  the  scene  we
vividly visualize “all  at once” depends on the
goals  that  constrain  the  act  of  visualization.
And, as Hohwy suggests, when we have no such
goals our imagery may end up “freewheeling”,
such that we move from one state to another.
Hohwy grounds his analysis in a predictive-cod-
ing account of  cognition, but his fundamental
point is independent of that theoretical frame-
work  and  should  be  fairly  uncontentious:  im-
agery surely  is more labile than perceptual ex-
perience or bodily sensation. No wonder, then,
that  its  phenomenal  structure  is  that  much
more difficult to articulate. 
I have suggested that the optimist has the
resources to meet (or at least “problematize”)
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two of the leading versions of the dumbfounding
argument. But suppose that my responses are
found wanting, and that the pessimist is able to
show that our introspective access to both emo-
tional and imagery phenomenology is  insecure
and impoverished.  Even so,  there would be a
further question as to how such a finding would
motivate  global pessimism. It  is  certainly true
that questions about the nature of certain kinds
of experiences (e.g., emotional and imagery ex-
periences) strike us as difficult to answer and
may leave us flummoxed, but it is equally true
that many introspective questions strike us as
easily answered. Indeed, as the quotation from
Gertler makes vivid, many of our introspective
judgments appear to be accompanied by a sense
of epistemic certainty. Why should we general-
ize from the first set of cases rather than the
second? Without an account of why certain in-
trospective questions leave us dumbfounded it is
difficult to see why pessimism about a particu-
lar range of introspective questions should un-
dermine the epistemic credentials of introspec-
tion more generally. So even if the threat posed
by dumbfounding arguments were able to estab-
lish  a  form  of  local  pessimism,  that  threat
would appear to be easily quarantined.
3.2 Dissociation arguments
A very different case for introspective pessim-
ism is provided by what I call dissociation ar-
guments. Such arguments appeal to a lack of
congruence  between  a  subject’s  introspective
judgments and their capacity to produce reli-
able first-order judgments—that is, judgments
about the objects and properties in their envir-
onment. An example of this kind of argument
is provided by Schwitzgebel’s treatment of the
so-called  “grand  illusion”  (Noë 2002).  Most
people, Schwitzgebel claims, hold that a broad
swathe of their environment—perhaps thirty or
more  degrees—is  clearly  presented  within
visual experience with its “shapes, colours, tex-
tures all sharply defined”. Schwitzgebel argues
that we have good reason to regard such claims
as false. In making the case for this claim, he
appeals  to  an  example  first  popularized  by
Dennett (1991):
Draw a card from a normal deck without
looking at it. Keeping your eyes fixed on
some point in front of you, hold the card
at arm’s length just beyond your field of
view.  Without  moving  your  eyes,  slowly
rotate the card toward the centre of your
visual field. How close to the centre must
you bring it before you can determine the
colour of the card, its suit, and its value?
Most people are quite surprised at the res-
ult of this little experiment. They substan-
tially overestimate their visual acuity out-
side the central, foveal region. When they
can’t make out whether it’s  a Jack or a
Queen though the card is nearly (but only
nearly)  dead  centre,  they  laugh,  they’re
astounded, dismayed. (Schwitzgebel 2008,
pp. 254–255)
How might we explain the dissociation between
subjects’  introspective  judgments  and  their
first-order judgments? One explanation is that
the subjects’ introspective beliefs are false, and
that people wrongly take themselves to have de-
tailed visual phenomenology outside of the fo-
cus of  attention.  This is  the explanation that
Schwitzgebel  endorses.  But  as  Schwitzgebel
(2008, p. 255) himself notes, it is possible to ex-
plain this dissociation by supposing that indi-
viduals are wrong not about which phenomenal
states they are in but only about the origin of
that state. With respect to the card trick ex-
ample, the proposal is that subjects do indeed
have detailed visual phenomenology outside of
the origin of attention, but that this phenomen-
ology  derives  from  background  expectation
rather than environmental input—that is, it is
“illusory”.
Schwitzgebel’s account of the dissociation
may have more intuitive appeal  than the ac-
count I have just outlined, but it is not clear
how the data furnished by the dissociation ar-
gument  allows  us  to  choose  between  them.
However,  reasons to favour Schwitzgebel’s ac-
count can be gleaned noting that the judgment
on which we have focused—“thirty or more de-
grees  of  my visual  field  presents  itself  to  me
clearly in experience with its shapes, colours,
textures  all  sharply  defined”—is  available  to
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introspection only indirectly. This judgment is
not the direct reflection of any one introspect-
ive  act,  but  is  a  belief  about  the  nature  of
one’s  visual  experience  that  one  forms  by
tracking  one’s  introspective  capacities  over
time. Call such judgments indirectly introspect-
ive.  Indirectly introspective judgments can be
contrasted with directly introspective judgments
—that  is,  judgments  of  the  kind  that  one
makes in the very context of the card trick ex-
periment, such as “I am now experiencing the
shape, colour, and texture of this card (which
is presented to me slightly off centre) in sharp
detail”. We can now see that although there is
a  dissociation  between  the  first-order  judg-
ments that subjects make and their indirect in-
trospective judgments, there is no such dissoci-
ation between their first-order judgments and
their  direct introspective  judgments.  Subjects
in the card-trick experiment don’t report exper-
iencing the shape, colour, and texture of cards
that are presented slightly off centre to them
“in  sharp  detail”—rather,  they  claim to  lack
sharp and detailed experiences of such objects.
Direct  introspective  judgments  clearly  have
more  warrant  than  indirect  judgments,  and
thus  there  is  good  reason  to  prefer
Schwitzgebel’s  explanation  of  the dissociation
over the alternative account. 
But  although  we  have  found  reasons  to
support Schwitzgebel’s  analysis  of  the dissoci-
ation, we have seen that these very reasons un-
dermine his pessimistic attitude to introspection
in  general,  for  the  evidence  in  favour  of
Schwitzgebel’s account involves an appeal to in-
trospection.  In other  words, the pressure that
the dissociation argument puts on indirect in-
trospective judgments assumes that direct intro-
spective  judgments  are  trustworthy.  The  card
trick case does indeed cast doubt on the epi-
stemic security of our  background beliefs about
our  own  visual  experience,  but  there  is  no
reason to extend such doubts to include our dir-
ect introspective judgments; and it is surely dir-
ect  introspective  judgments  that  are  at  the
heart of debates about the trustworthiness of in-
trospection.  (Indeed,  indirect  introspection
judgments are not really a genuine form of in-
trospection at all.) 
Let us turn now to the second step of the
dissociation argument: the inference from local
pessimism to general pessimism. Suppose that
we were to find a dissociation between a certain
range of introspective judgments and the sub-
ject’s capacity to make the corresponding first-
order  judgments.  Suppose,  furthermore,  that
one could show that this dissociation is best ex-
plained  by  assuming  that  the  introspective
judgments  in  question  were  false.  Would  one
have any reason to think that introspection  in
general ought  to  be  regarded  with  suspicion?
Not as far as I can see. It seems to me that our
faith in the robustness of introspective access to
domains in which such dissociations are not to
be  found  ought  to  remain  completely  un-
troubled by such a finding. In fact, one might
even  argue  that  coherence  between  first-order
judgments and (direct) introspective judgments
would provide evidence in favour of introspect-
ive  optimism.  If  dissociations  between  a  per-
son’s introspective capacities and their first-or-
der capacities can disconfirm their introspective
judgments  (as  the  dissociation  argument  as-
sumes), then associations between a person’s in-
trospective judgments and their first-order ca-
pacities  ought  to  confirm them  (Bayne &
Spener 2010). In other words, the fact that a
person’s  introspective  judgments  cohere  with
their  capacity  to  produce  reliable  reports  of
their environment ought to provide us with pos-
itive reason to trust those judgments.10 And a
great  number  of  our  introspective  reports
clearly do cohere with our first-order capacities.
Although there are cases in which such coher-
ence fails to obtain—for example,  Schwitzgebel
(2011, Ch. 3) provides a plausible case for the
claim  that  introspective  reports  of  visual  im-
agery are only weakly correlated with the kinds
of first-order cognitive capacities that one would
expect  visual  imagery to subserve—such cases
10 This argument is closely related to an argument presented by  Spener
(2013) in defence of the idea that we can provide principled reasons for
trusting introspection in certain contexts.  Spener argues that certain
everyday abilities, such as adjusting a pair of binoculars or ordering food
in a restaurant, are introspection-reliant—that is, their successful execu-
tion requires that the subject have accurate introspective judgments. I
find Spener’s argument plausible, but, as Schwitzgebel (2013) notes, it is
something of an open question just how many of our everyday abilities
are reliant on introspection. At any rate, the argument I have given here
makes no appeal to that notion. 
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are  striking  precisely  because  they  stand  out
against the backdrop of coherence that charac-
terizes the relationship between our normal in-
trospective reports and our first-order  percep-
tual capacities. 
3.3 Arguments from introspective variation
Perhaps  the  strongest  case  for  introspective
pessimism derives from the phenomenon of in-
trospective  variation.  Such arguments  have  as
their starting point a disagreement about how
best to describe some aspect of phenomenology.
Pessimists then argue that the best explanation
for the introspective dispute is that at least one
of  the  two groups  is  mistaken about  its  own
phenomenology, and thus that introspective ac-
cess to the relevant phenomenal domain is in-
secure: despite their best efforts, at least one of
the two parties to the dispute is wrong about
its own phenomenology.
Schwitzgebel (2008) examines a number of
arguments from introspective variation, but his
central case study concerns a debate about the
nature of conscious thought—the so-called “cog-
nitive  phenomenology”  debate  (Bayne &
Montague 2011; Smithies 2013).11 On one side of
this dispute are those who deny that thought
has a distinctive phenomenal character. Those
who  hold  this  view  typically  allow  that  con-
scious  thought  has  a  phenomenology  of  some
kind,  but  they regard that  phenomenology as
purely sensory—as limited to the phenomeno-
logy of inner speech, visual imagery, and so on.
We might call this the conservative account of
conscious thought, for it treats phenomenal con-
sciousness as limited to sensory aspects of the
mind.  On  the  other  side  of  this  dispute  are
those  who adopt  a  liberal  conception  of  con-
scious  thought,  according  to  which  conscious
thought is characterized by a range of non-sens-
ory  phenomenal  states—states  of  “cognitive
phenomenology”. It is tempting to conclude that
at  least  one of  these two sides  is  guilty  of  a
11 Other examples of recent introspective disagreement concern the ap-
parent shape of the objects of visual experience (e.g.,  Siewert 2007;
Schwitzgebel 2011, Ch. 2), the existence of high-level perceptual phe-
nomenology (Siegel 2006;  Bayne 2009), and the satisfaction condi-
tions of the phenomenology of free will (e.g., Horgan 2012; Nahmias
et al. 2004). 
fairly  radical  introspective  error:  introspection
either  fails  to  inform conservatives  of  a  wide
range of phenomenal states that they enjoy on a
regular basis, or it misleads liberals into think-
ing that they enjoy a wide range of phenomenal
states that they don’t enjoy. Either way, intro-
spection would seem to be untrustworthy with
respect to what is  clearly a central feature of
phenomenology.12
But  before  we  follow  Schwitzgebel  (and
many others) in embracing this conclusion, we
need to consider alternative explanations of the
cognitive phenomenology dispute. One possible
explanation appeals to group differences in phe-
nomenology.  Perhaps  the  descriptions  of  con-
scious thought that both liberals and conservat-
ives give are right when applied to themselves
but  wrong  when  taken  to  describe  conscious
thought  in  general.  In  other  words,  perhaps
both parties to the dispute are guilty of  over
over-hasty generalization rather than introspect-
ive error. 
Although an appeal  to  group differences
might explain (away) some instances of  intro-
spective disagreement, it is unlikely to provide
the best explanation of the cognitive phenomen-
ology dispute. First, this account requires a de-
gree  of  variation  in  phenomenology  for  which
there are few (if any) parallels. This is not to
say that phenomenal differences between indi-
viduals might not run much deeper than com-
mon-sense  tends  to  assume—consider,  for  ex-
ample, the phenomenal differences that charac-
terize synaesthesia (Robertson & Sagiv 2005)—
but the kinds of phenomenal differences that we
already  recognize  are  nowhere  near  as  funda-
mental as the kinds of differences required by
this explanation of the cognitive phenomenology
debate, for liberals claim that conscious thought
is characterized by a  sui generis kind of phe-
nomenology—a  kind  that  is  non-sensory  in
nature.  Second,  the  group  difference  proposal
predicts  that  there  are  cognitive  and  behavi-
oural differences between the advocates of cog-
nitive phenomenology and their detractors that
simply don’t appear to obtain. In sum, it seems
12 The conservative view is also known as the “restrictive” (Prinz 2011) or
“exclusivist” (Siewert 2011) view, while the liberal view is also known as
the “expansionist” (Prinz 2011) or “inclusivist” (Siewert 2011) view.
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highly unlikely that the debate about the exist-
ence  of  cognitive  phenomenology  can  be  ex-
plained by supposing that what it is like to be a
liberal is different from what it is like to be a
conservative. 
But there is another deflationary explana-
tion of the debate about cognitive phenomeno-
logy that cannot be so easily dismissed. Perhaps
the  parties  to  the  debate  are  operating  with
very different conceptions of what it would take
for  thought  to  possess  distinctive  phenomenal
character,  and  are  thus  talking  passed  each
other  (Bayne unpublished).  On  this  proposal,
liberals are willing to extend the notion of phe-
nomenal  consciousness  beyond  its  sensory
paradigms in a way that conservatives are not.
If  this account is  right,  then the dispute sur-
rounding the existence of cognitive phenomeno-
logy is largely verbal. Rather than disagreeing
about what introspection reveals, the two sides
instead disagree about how the term “phenom-
enal consciousness” and its cognates ought to be
employed.
Why  take  this  proposal  seriously?  Well,
one argument for it is that it would provide a
good  explanation  of  why  there  is  such  wide-
spread disagreement about the nature of  con-
scious thought—the very terms in which the de-
bate are couched are contested. It is also widely
acknowledged that there are different notions of
“what  it’s  likeness”  (see  e.g.,  Tye 1996;
Flanagan 1992;  Georgalis 2005). Although this
proposal clearly needs much more defence and
development than I can give it here, I think it is
not unreasonable to suppose that the disagree-
ment  surrounding  the  existence  of  cognitive
phenomenology  might  turn  out  to  be  largely
verbal. At any rate, it seems to me that this ac-
count provides at least as good an explanation
of the dispute as that which is required by the
argument from variation.13 
13 Of course, the pessimist might argue that, even if the disagree-
ment surrounding  the phenomenology of  thought  is  fundament-
ally semantic, it doesn’t follow that the optimist is off the hook.
After all, using introspection to ground a science of consciousness
doesn’t merely require the reliability of introspection, it also re -
quires intersubjective agreement about its deliverances. And—the
pessimist might continue—dispute about how to apply the term
“phenomenal consciousness” and its cognates threatens to under-
mine  intersubjective  disagreement  about  what  introspection  re-
veals just as surely as introspective unreliability does. This is a
There  are,  of  course,  other  introspective
disagreements besides that concerning the phe-
nomenology of thought, and nothing that I have
said here goes any way towards showing that
they too succumb to a deflationary analysis. In-
deed,  I  suspect  that  certain  introspective  dis-
putes—for example, those relating to the rich-
ness  of  visual  imagery—may well  be best  ex-
plained  by  appeal  to  introspective  error.  But
even if the argument from variation succeeds in
establishing a local form of pessimism, it seems
to me there is little reason to think that this
pessimism  generalizes.  Indeed,  domains  that
feature  disagreement  in  introspective  reports
stand out against a general backdrop of intro-
spective agreement. Arguably many domains of
consciousness exhibit a great deal of uniformity
with respect to introspective reports once indi-
vidual differences and verbal disputes are taken
into  account.  Now,  although  inter-subjective
agreement doesn’t entail that the individuals in
question are right, it does need to be explained,
and it seems plausible to suppose that leading
explanations of  inter-subjective agreement will
appeal to the trustworthiness of introspection. 
4 Elusive phenomenology
In the previous section I argued that there are
good  reasons  for  resisting  Schwitzgebel’s  case
for global pessimism. However, we also saw that
there are domains in which our introspective ac-
cess to phenomenal consciousness is rather less
secure than we might have pre-theoretically as-
sumed.  In  other  words,  we  saw that  there  is
reason to think that certain kinds of phenom-
enal states are introspectively elusive. In this fi-
nal section I want to sketch an account of why
certain types of phenomenal states are elusive
and others are not. 
Let me begin by distinguishing the form of
phenomenal  elusiveness  with which I  am con-
cerned from another notion of phenomenal elu-
siveness that I want to set to one side. In a re-
cent paper,  Kriegel uses the label “elusive phe-
fair challenge, but in my view the prospects for securing a solu-
tion to the cognitive phenomenology dispute, should it turn out
to be fundamentally semantic, are quite high. For further discus-
sion of phenomenal disputes  and introspective disagreement see
Hohwy (2011) and Siewert (2007). 
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nomenology”  to  describe  phenomenal  states
“whose very essence requires the absence of in-
trospective attention” (2013,  p. 1171).  Among
the examples that he gives of elusive phenomen-
ology are the phenomenal states that occur at
the  fringes  or  margins  of  consciousness.  As
Kriegel notes, such states are elusive in that any
attempt to make them the object of attentive
introspection  would  change  their  nature.  Al-
though Kriegel’s notion of elusiveness is closely
related to the one that I employ here, the two
notions  are not  identical.  (One way of  seeing
that they are distinct is that Kriegel’s elusive-
ness  is  primarily a matter of  the phenomeno-
logy, whereas my elusiveness is a matter of one’s
introspective access to the phenomenology.) Un-
like Kriegel, I am interested in a type of elusive-
ness that is independent of attention. Consider
again  visual  imagery.  Although  particular  in-
stances  of  visual  imagery might  be  elusive  in
Kriegel’s sense because they happen to occupy
the  margins  of  consciousness,  I  am interested
here in the fact that visual imagery as such ap-
pears to be introspectively elusive.14 
Why might  certain  types  of  phenomenal
states be elusive in a way that other types of
phenomenal states are not? Broadly speaking,
there are two places in which we might look for
an answer to this question. On the one hand we
might appeal  to intrinsic  features  of  the phe-
nomenal  states  themselves.  Perhaps  there  is
something inherent in the very nature of certain
kinds of phenomenal states that renders them
relatively  opaque  to  introspective  access.  An-
other possibility is that the elusiveness of cer-
tain types of phenomenal states has nothing to
do with  their  intrinsic  nature  but  instead re-
flects the structure of our introspective capacit-
ies. Just as our perceptual system is geared to-
ward the identification of certain kinds of envir-
onmental states rather than others, so too it is
possible that our introspective system is geared
towards  the  identification  of  certain  kinds  of
phenomenal states rather than others. On this
view, the fact that our introspective access to
some  types  of  phenomenology  is  more  secure
14 Phenomenal domains that are at least somewhat elusive include the phe-
nomenology of agency (Metzinger 2006; Bayne 2008; Horgan et al. 2006)
and high-level perceptual phenomenology (Siegel 2006; Bayne 2009).
than it is to others tells us more about intro-
spection than it tells us about phenomenal con-
sciousness (as it were). 
It  is,  I  think,  premature  to  speculate
which  of  these  two  accounts  might  be  the
more  plausible;  indeed,  it  is  possible  that  a
full  explanation  of  elusiveness  will  have  to
draw on both ideas.  But rather  than pursue
that  thought,  I  want  instead  to  sketch  one
way in which the structural features of intro-
spection might go some way towards explain-
ing  why  certain  types  of  introspective  judg-
ments  are  more  secure  than others.  The ac-
count  in  question  appeals  to  a  distinction
between two kinds of introspective judgments:
scaffolded  judgments and  freestanding  judg-
ments (Bayne & Spener 2010). The distinction
is perhaps best grasped by means of examples.
Contrast  an  introspective  judgment  that  is
directed  towards  one’s  visual  experience  of
looking at a red tomato with an introspective
judgment that is directed towards an experi-
ence of visual imagery involving a red tomato
in front of one. In the former case, there is a
perceptual  judgment that  one is  disposed  to
make (“There is a red tomato in front of me”)
whose content corresponds (broadly speaking)
to the content of one’s introspective judgment
(“I have an experience as of a red tomato in
front  of  me”).  In  the  latter  case,  however,
there is no such first-order judgment that one
is disposed to make whose content might cor-
respond to the content of one’s introspective
judgment. In a sense, the former judgment is
“scaffolded” by a perceptual disposition in a
way that the latter judgment is not.
I  suggest  that  scaffolded  judgments  are
typically  more  secure  than freestanding  ones
precisely because they are scaffolded. At the
very least,  it is a striking fact that many of
the  most  epistemically  insecure  introspective
judgments appear to be freestanding. Further,
one can tell an attractive story about why in-
trospective  scaffolding  might  contribute  to
epistemic security. In making scaffolded judg-
ments, the subject is able to both exploit the
resources that it has for making freestanding
judgments  and  calibrate  those  resources  by
drawing on its dispositions to make first-order
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perceptual  judgments.15 Just  as  beliefs  that
are  derived  from  multiple  (independent)
sources are typically more secure than beliefs
derived from just a single source, so too scaf-
folded introspective judgments might typically
be  more  secure  than  their  freestanding
brethren.
5 Conclusion 
This  paper  provides  a  partial  response  to
Schwitzgebel’s  case  for  global  pessimism with
respect  to introspection.  I  began by outlining
two arguments for optimism; the first argument
turned on an appeal to the phenomenology of
introspection, while the second drew on a con-
ceptual connection between the notions of intro-
spective access and phenomenality. Neither ar-
gument comes close to being decisive, but taken
together  they  provide  some  explanation  for—
and justification of—the widespread appeal of
optimism. I then turned to a detailed examina-
tion  of  Schwitzgebel’s  case  for  pessimism,  ar-
guing that although his arguments go some way
towards justifying local pessimism (particularly
with respect to imagery), there is little reason
to generalize that pessimistic attitude to intro-
spection more generally. 
But perhaps the central lesson of this pa-
per is that the epistemic landscape of introspec-
tion is far from flat but contains peaks of secur-
ity alongside troughs of insecurity. Rather than
asking  whether  or  not  introspective  access  to
the  phenomenal  character  of  consciousness  is
trustworthy,  we  should  perhaps  focus  on  the
task of identifying how secure our introspective
access to various kinds of phenomenal states is,
and why our access to some kinds of phenom-
enal states appears to be more secure than our
access  to  other  kinds of  phenomenal  states.  I
have suggested that the notion of introspective
scaffolding might play a role in answering this
second question,  but  that  that  proposal  is  at
15 An influential account of introspection holds that introspection in-
volves a semantic ascent routine in which one redeploys rather than
represents  one’s  introspective  target  (Byrne 2005;  Evans 1982;
Fernández 2013). Although I am not endorsing this account of intro-
spection in general (or indeed of introspective access to perceptual
phenomenology in particular), I am suggesting that such procedures
might be implicated in introspective access to certain kinds of phe-
nomenal states. 
best only a very small part of a much larger ac-
count of introspective insecurity. There is  cer-
tainly a lot more work to be done before we
have a good grip on the epistemic structure of
introspection.
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